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Summary findings
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*  Encouraged market entry for more foreign and  obstacles to private technology transfer through  the
domestic companies involved in production  and trade in  production  and trade of inputs.
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* Where inputs brought new technology, allowed  Malawi (in 1995-96),  and Romania (in 1997).
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iv1.  INTRODUCTION
From the early 1980s Turkey progressively eased regulations controlling private introduction of
new agricultural technology through inputs production and trade. This study describes Turkey's
1  980s reforms and estimates impact on technology transfer, productivity, and incomes.
Section 1 presents research hypotheses and introduces agriculture in Turkey. Section 2 describes
Turkey's  reforms.  Sections  3  and  4  assess  impact  on  technology  transfer,  inputs  supply,
productivity, and incomes. Section 5 presents conclusions and recommendations.
1.1  Hypotheses:  Regulations Slow Technical Change
Governments of many World Bank client countries regulate private introduction of new agricultural
technology -- through seeds, fertilizers, and other inputs -- in ways that go beyond concerns about
externalities (Gisselquist 1994b). Controls on agricultural technology -- beyond what is necessary
to  deal  with  externalities and  other public  responsibilities --  are  inconsistent  with  standard
principles for managing a market economy. However, that alone is not sufficient reason to spend
political capital to promote regulatory reform if reform would have no impact. The case for reform
rests on the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis:  Reducing  regulatory  obstacles  to  private  introduction  of  new
technology accelerates technology introduction based on private research and/or
technology transfer and has a signficant net positive impact on productivity and
incomes.
Those who argue that regulatory reforms would have minimal impact raise doubts on several
points, including: suitable foreign technology might not be available; companies and farmers might
not respond to opportunities; and new private technology might have little beneficial impact. These
concerns are addressed in the following sub-hypotheses:
Sub-Hypothesis 1:  Appropriate new technology is available for borrowing from
other countries.'
Sub-Hypothesis 2:  When policies  allow the  private  sector to  introduce  new
technology, companies offer and farmers adopt new technology (from in-country
research and/or technology transfer).
Sub-hypothesis  I revisits  an old argument  in agricultural  development  literature. Immediately  after WWII,
many agricultural  experts  looked for technology  transfer  to deliver  productivity  increases. However,  for important
crops,  varieties  from  temperate  developed  countries  were not suited  for  many tropical  developing  countries.  During  the
1950s  and 1960s,  optimism  about  technology  transfer  gave way to pessimism  and to increased  emphasis  on research.
Over the last 30 years, more plant breeding  and other research  -- in private  companies,  international  agricultural
research  centers  (IARCs),  and national  research  programs  -- has generated  new technologies  for tropical  environments.
These  arguments,  however,  are not relevant  for Turkey,  which  lies at similar  latitudes  to the Great  Plains  in  the US.
-1-Sub-Hypothesis 3:  Technology transfered by the private sector has a significant
positive impact on producer and/or consumer incomes.
If research supports these hypotheses, it makes sense for donors and governments to promote
regulatory  reforms.  Since regulatory  reforms  cost  little to  implement, this  would  not  at  all
undermine other programs and strategies for agricultural growth, such as public sector research and
extension.
1.2  Country  Study to Test Hypotheses
Fortunately, research can be  designed to test these hypotheses. Over the  last several decades,
governments of developing countries have demonstrated a  wide range of regulatory strategies.
Some countries, such as Thailand, have allowed private companies to introduce new agricultural
technology with minimal interference. Others have extended input regulations beyond externalities
into other  issues,  such  as  technology  performance, price,  and  protection for  domestic  input
industries.
Over the last 15 years, a small but growing number of countries have eased regulations to facilitate
private introduction of new agricultural technology. A partial list of reforming countries includes
Chile from the 1970s, Turkey from the early 1980s, and Bangladesh and India from the late 1980s.
These countries present opportunities to test the hypothesis that easing regulations has an impact on
technical change, productivity, and incomes. This country case study looks at Turkey, a country
with extensive regulatory reformns  for which impact can be observed over more than a decade.
1.3  Pre-Reform Agriculture in Turkey
Turkey lies the same distance from the equator as Spain, northern China, Japan, Kansas in the US,
and  southern Argentina. The  country offers a  wide  range of  climates that  supports a  varied
agriculture. Along the Mediterranean coast, hot dry summers and mild winters support citrus and
other fruit production, while on the Anatolian Plateau in the center and east of the country, cold
winters with little precipitation favors grain and pastures. With its relatively high latitude and wide
range of climates, Turkey has been able over the years to adopt plant varieties, animal breeds, and
other technologies from the US and Central and Western Europe as well as from Mediterranean and
sub-tropical countries.
After WWII, Turkey shifted rapidly from an agriculture-dominated  economy to a mixed economy.
Around 1950, agriculture in Turkey employed 80 percent of the labor force, produced 50 percent of
GNP, and supplied 90 percent of exports. By 1980, agriculture's share of labor was near 60 percent,
while share of GNP had fallen below 25 percent; agriculture continued to produce two-thirds of
total exports (MARA 1968, pp 11, 107; SIS 1977, p 166; SIS 1985, p 210; GATT 1994, vol 1, p
21).
Tractors and  Fertilizers (Table  4.1):  From  WWII  to  1980, despite  government  controls  on
technology  transfer, government  allowed  and  sponsored  enough  new  technology  to  support
agricultural growth, though technology and growth was uneven across crops and products. For
-2-relatively simple inputs  such as tractors and major fertilizer nutrients, government-led growth
worked reasonably well.
With support from the Marshall Plan, government from the  1950s encourged introduction of
tractors. Sown area increased by 50 percent during the  1950s (MARA  1968, p 41), and by the
1980s use of tractors for land preparation was nearly universal. Similarly, fertilizer consumption
(nutrients) grew from less than 10,000 tons in 1950 to more than 1.3 million tons (average of 100
kilograms per hectare [kg/h] for sown area) in 1980 (MARA 1986, p 29; Ange 1994, p 10). Such
large increases in fertilizer use imply shifts to new varieties and yield increases for major crops.
New Varieties for Wheat (Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2): Wheat, which is indigenous to the area, is the
major crop and dietary staple. Spring wheat is grown on the coastal plain and covers 27 percent of
wheat  area,  while  winter  wheat  is  grown  in  the  Anatolian  Plateau  and  a  transition  zone.
Government scientists conducted research on wheat from the  1920s and had released about 30
varieties by 1960 (Dalrymple 1986). Despite this in-country research effort, the percent of wheat
area planted to improved varieties in the mid-1960s was in the low single digits. Wheat yields
increased only 0.5 percent per year from 1938-42 through 1962-64 (MARA 1968, p 45).
From 1960, government scientists in Turkey had begun to field test newly developed spring wheat
varieties from the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) in Mexico.
Although tests soon demonstrated to scientists as well as many farmers that CIMMYT varieties
offered significant gains over local ones, government continued to treat them as illegal, actively
discouraging  their  introduction.  One  expert  speculates  that  government  scientists  blocked
CIMMYT  varieties because they  wanted  to  breed  and  release  their  own  varieties,  crossing
CIMMYT and Turkish wheats. However, "such a program would ... take a long time. It turned out
farmers were not willing to wait" (Aresvik 1975, p 154).
In 1965, John Elisham, a farmer and businessman, acquired about 25 kgs of seed of a CIMMYT
variety with assistance from an AID official, who smuggled the seed from Pakistan through the US
diplomatic pouch (Elisham personal communication 1994; Frizzell 1968, p 3). The farmer's wheat
field, which was prominently located near a government farm, yielded more than four tons per
hectare (t/ha), twice yields in nearby fields. More than 100 farmers in the region arranged funds and
asked Ministry of Agriculture (MARA 2) for permission to import 60 tons of seed of CIMMYT
varieties for 1966. After discussions that went as far as Parliament, and with the support of a senior
MARA administrator who had seen Elisham's wheat field, MARA agreed.
One year  later, in  1967, the Minister of  Agriculture, Bahri Dagdas, pushed  through  MARA
approval to import 20,000 tons of seed of 13 different varieties -- mostly CIMMYT spring wheats,
with some US winter wheats -- using USAID funds. Government scientists opposed the initiative,
arguing that "not enough was known about the adaptation of the Mexican varieties" (Aresvik 1975,
p  157). At the time regulations required field testing varieties for five years, a rule which was
2  For all time  periods,  this paper  uses  the acronym  MARA  to designate  the ministry  responsible  for agriculture,
though  its name  and other  duties  have  shifted  over  time.
-3-waived for the 1967 wheat seed imports. From less than 0.01 percent of wheat area in 1966/67,
CIMMYT  varieties spread to  8.9 percent  in  1968/69, giving  18 percent  of wheat production
(Aresvik  1975, p  168). Thereafter, government agencies  steadily  tested  and  introduced  new
varieties of spring wheat from multiple sources.
For the winter wheat areas, government imported US winter wheat in  1967 and also approved
introduction of the variety Bezostaya from Russia in the late  1960s. In the  1970s, government
registered several local crosses. Another technology transfer that boosted winter wheat yields on the
Anatolian  Plateau  in  the  1970s  was  introduction  of  the  herbicide  2,4-D.  With  these  new
technologies, wheat yields rose from an average of 1.1 t/ha during 1962-1966,  the five years before
CIMMYT, US, and Russian wheats were introduced, to  1.8 t/ha in  1976-80. Over this  14 year
period, wheat yields increased 3.6 percent per year (SIS 1981, p 3).
New Varieties for Cotton and Sugar Beets (Figure 4.3):  Something similar seems to have occurred
in cotton and sugar beets, where production-oriented government agencies introduced improved
varieties from foreign lines as early as the 1950s and 1960s. Around 1950, government released
foreign-origin Acala varieties. During the 1960s, government seed programs promoted new upland
varieties locally bred and selected from Deltapine and Coker varieties imported in 1948 (Evans and
Porter 1971, p 13). Cotton (lint) yields increased from an average of 216 kg/ha in 1945/46-1949/50
to 780 kg/ha in 1975/76-1979/80  (Cotton Advisory Committee 1993).
Over the years, cotton farmers also chaffed under varietal restrictions. John Elisham, the man who
helped to introduce CIMMYT wheat, reports that a relative in 1930 planted seeds of an acala cotton
variety that government had not approved, and again in the 1960s planted seeds from Syria of
another cotton variety that government had not approved; both times government began but did not
pursue court cases against him.
KWS, a German company that is a world leader in sugar beet breeding, began working in Turkey
from 1928. In 1956, KWS became a partner with the government in Pan Tohum. KWS germplasm
in Pan Tohum's sugar beet seeds contributed to large yield increases in the 1960s.
Livestock and Poultry (Figure 4.5): Turkey's programs for livestock development, both public and
private, have been built around efforts to import and to extend foreign technology. Government
began to introduce exotic cattle breeds from  1925. Other technology imports include feed pre-
mixes, pharmaceuticals and vaccines, and equipment such as incubators.
The modern poultry industry in Turkey began in the 1960s. Pfizer began to sell poultry pre-mixes
in the 1960s. In the 1970s, six private broiler breeder farms began operation, and Development
Foundation of Turkey (TKV), a large production-oriented NGO, began its poultry activities (TKV
1992, part 1, p 10). Average annual increases in number of birds rose from 2 to 6 percent from the
1960s to the 1970s, while annual growth in egg production rose from 4 to 8 percent (SIS 1981, p
13; SIS 1994, p 15). Toward the end of the 1970s, continuing rapid growth brought some problems
into focus. Poultry farmers faced more disease problems, while government controls blocked
vaccine imports. Also, import controls disrupted markets for major feed components, including
maize and soy meal.
-4-Problems with Technology Transfer: Before 1980s, government agricultural development efforts
focused on export crops and wheat, the major staple. Even for these crops, however, farmers and
input industries often faced official road-blocks against new technology. For  other crops and
agricultural  products,  regulatory  obstacles to  technology  transfer  attracted  less  attention  and
criticism.
By 1980, however, the development of Turkish agriculture, even with limited technology transfer,
created a demand for more new technology. Company and farmer interest and ability to transfer and
adopt  new technology  --  such  as  poultry vaccines  and  vegetable varieties  --  contributed to
regulatory liberalization from the 1980s.
2.  REFORMS
In the mid-1960s, a USAID agricultural expert in Turkey noted that government import policies
blocked technology transfer (Mathiasen 1967, p 26):
... new types of farm machinery, implements, or other inputs that are not included in
the import regime cannot be imported by private individuals except with the greatest
of difficulty. Hence, the adoption by private farmers of new techniques and devices
developed abroad is discouraged.
Import controls and other policies that blocked technology transfer continued in place through the
1970s.
In the early 1980s, Turkish economic strategy shifted from import substitution with extensive trade
controls towards trade liberalization and industrial export promotion. Merchandise exports grew
from 5 to 8 percent of GDP from 1980 to 1990, while manufactures increased from roughly one-
quarter to two-thirds of exports (GATT 1994, vol  1, pp 1, 133). Early 1980s reforms ended many
price controls and other limits on domestic economic activities, eliminated most non-tariff barriers
on imports and exports, established market allocation of foreign exchange, and removed barriers to
foreign investment.
Despite economic reforms, specific regulations continued to block private sector production and
trade  for  seeds  and  other  agricultural  inputs.  Nevertheless,  economic  liberalization  created
conditions that favored subsequent deregulation of inputs production and trade, as described in this
paper.
2.1  Seeds
2.1.1  Pre-1980s Government Controls
For many years Turkey regulated seed trade without any special seed law, taking authority from
more general laws governing trade and investment. Turkey's seed legislation dates from 1963, with
-5-Seed Law No 308 giving MARA authority over seed production, domestic trade, imports, and
exports (Freiberg and Grobman  1985, pp 284-288). While this law provides the framework for
control,  implementation  depends  on  subsidiary  regulations  and  practices.  Over  the  years,
government has amended the law and associated regulations, and practices have also shifted.
Registration: With respect to variety registration -- listing of crop varieties for which seed may be
sold -- Article 4 of Law 308 gives the Minister of Agriculture authority to decide which species
(crops) are subject to compulsory registration. MARA has over the years insisted on compulsory
registration for essentially all crops of interest to  seed companies. For major crops, only local
varieties, for which seed is commonly sold farmer-to-farmer rather than by seed companies, do not
have to be registered.
Article 6 gives the Minister authority to decide whether or not to register each foreign variety after
"adaptation tests  in  our country  and  after their  economic and  agricultural values have  been
determined..." In other words, registration is based on economic performance; externalities are not
even mentioned. Sometime before 1980, MARA began to issue "production permits" as a form of
second-class registration. Production permits expire after a fixed term (often four years), and some
production permits limit use of the seeds, such as to produce goods for export only.
Turkey's system of compulsory variety registration based on in-country performance tests was more
restrictive than practices in many countries, including most developed countries. The US, India,
Chile, Mexico, and many other countries do not require variety registration before seed can be sold.
Although EU countries require registration, once a variety is registered in any one EU country
(after two years of tests), seeds can be sold in all EU countries without further tests.
The impact of compulsory variety registration on technology transfer depends in part on the attitude
of those managing the registration process. MARA's Registration Committee is an advisory body
that reports directly to the Minister, who has legal authority. This Committee takes advice from
multinle sources. Before 1980s reforms, control-oriented advice from MARA's research scientists
and  their  close associates  in  MARA's  Variety  Testing  and  Registration Institute 3 dominated
Committee decisions. With such advice, MARA used compulsory registration to block entry for
most foreign varieties, making it all but impossible for private companies to operate.
Certification:  Certification is an assertion that seed is of the variety that it is presented to be. In
Turkey, as in many other countries, certification includes additional quality assurances, such as that
germination is above some percent, that seed of other varieties or species is less than some percent,
etc.
Law 308 authorizes MARA to set seed quality standards as well as to test seeds. MARA exercised
this authority by insisting on compulsory certification for all seed sold, except for farmer-to-farmer
3  The  Variety  Testing  and Registration  Institute  and the Seed  Testing  and Certification  Institute  have  been  with
MARA  from the time of the 1963 Seed Law. In 1987,  these agencies  were merged into the Seed Registration  and
Certification  Centre.
-6-sales. With compulsory certification, seed producers must arrange for MARA to test and approve
seed in the field as well as after processing, and this can be particularly troublesome for relatively
small producers.
Turkey's approach -- compulsory certification -- is similar to EU practice. Seed certification is
voluntary in the US, India, and many other countries. With voluntary certification, seed producers
attest to the quality of their seed, while governments enforce truth-in-labelling.
Other Controls: With authority from Law 308, MARA annually fixed seed prices for most major
crops. In addition, Article 11 gives MARA authority to control seed imports and exports, without
limiting controls to phytosanitary issues. Before 1980s reforms, MARA used this  authority to
restrict private seed trade primarily to vegetables.
2.1.2  1980s Reforms Welcome the Private Sector
Entering the 1980s, MARA limited variety approvals for most field crops to those sponsored by
government research  agencies.  Although  private companies  were  more  active in  vegetables,
importing and producing seeds, MARA controls blocked entry for new companies and cultivars.
For example, through 1980 MARA had registered (allowed) only one cucumber hybrid and two
tomato hybrids, for which seed trade was monopolized by domestic companies licensed as sole
distributors. Several local firms, most prominently May Seed Company, open-pollinated vegetable
seed. Smuggling provided a significant share of vegetable seeds, including, for many years, all
hybrid watermelon seeds.
Along with  smuggling, other evidence of failed seed policies included government inability to
popularize hybrid maize and large and expensive government seed agencies serving no more than
about 10 percent of planted area. Frustrated with these and other difficulties, officials decided to
stimulate rapid expansion of  Turkey's  private  seed  industry and  to  invite multinational seed
companies to participate.
In 1981, Turkey asked the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to help promote private seed
production and trade. IFC in turn asked the Industry Council for Development (ICD) 4 to identify
seed markets, to evaluate strategies for private participation, and to suggest policy changes (ICD
1982, vol 1, p 2). A 1982 ICD mission diagnosed policy obstacles:
The government variety testing program makes it extremely difficult to introduce
genetic advances in seed technology available elsewhere in the world... The time
span for new variety introduction, including hybrids, and their approval by the key
Variety Registration Committee, is a minimum of three years... Seed companies
operating outside Turkey have been very reluctant to  undergo the lengthy time
period required to obtain commercial introduction of hybrids in Turkey or to make
4  ICD is a US-based  non-profit  organization,  supported  by large multinationals,  with a mandate  to promote
trade  and investment  to support  development.
-7-available  the local production  of parent  lines  under the system of rigid price fixing
and the minimum  margin  structure  of the industry  (ICD 1982,  vol 1, p 35).
ICD recommended  that Turkey eliminate  price controls on seeds and allow "free import ... by
private organizations  for testing and marketing  purposes, subject only to phytosanitary  import
regulations"  (ICD 1982,  vol 1, p 75). Notably, allowing  free import for marketing  entails doing
away  with compulsory  variety  registration.
Government acted quickly, though reforms fell  short  of  dismantling compulsory variety
registration.  A 1983  ICD  paper reported  changes  "in the body of regulations  pertaining  to the seed
industry,"  including  (Grobman  1983,  pp 1-2):
*  from October 1982 government  allowed  private  companies  to do their own variety
performance  tests, reporting  results  to the government,  which continued  to decide
whether  or not to approve  each  variety;
*  MARA's  Registration  Committee  is prepared  to issue production  permits for new
varieties "even without testing, provided that evidence is presented  that such a
variety  has been  successfully  grown  in a similar  ecological  region."
government  lowered  testing  requirements  from  the previous  minimum  of three  years
to 1-3  years,  depending  on crop  and type  of seed  (eg, one year  for hybrids,  two years
for vegetables);
*  since  December  1983,  each  seed firm  is allowed  to set its own seed  prices.
As part of efforts  to stimulate  private  domestic  and foreign  investment,  MARA  and ICD  organized
a National Seed Enterprise  Development  Workshop  in Istanbul in May 1984, inviting private
Turkish  and foreign  seed companies  and soliciting  their views. Government  also relaxed controls
on private  foreign  investment  and made  credit  available  for seed  companies.
2.1.3  Post-Reform  Seed  Regulations
Seed regulations  have continued  to adjust over time. Throughout,  government  regulatory  agencies
have continued  to claim and exercise  controls  that go beyond externalities  and that are in some
respects more stringent  than in most developed  countries.  Nevertheless,  regulations  have been
implemented  in a way that allows  private companies  to operate,  despite  continuing  limits on seed
imports  and entry  for new varieties  and firms.
Licensing  Seed Companies:  Government  licenses  seed companies  in two categories,  designating
stronger  ones (with  land and scientific  staff)  as research  companies,  which  allows  them to do their
own variety trials. Other seed companies  must ask research  companies  or government  farms for
help  with  variety  trials.
-8-Variety Registration: Turkey has maintained compulsory variety  registration, but  has  reduced
required tests, allowed companies to do their own testing, and expanded use of production permits
to speed entry for new varieties. Changes in regulations and the attitudes and behavior of the
Registration Committee reflected advice from MARA's Seed Division (which was more reform-
oriented  than  MARA's  Variety  Testing  and  Registration Institute)  along  with  private  seed
companies.
As of 1997, the Registration Committee accepts identification and description of varieties from
foreign registration 5 and asks for  one year of performance tests only.  For varieties not registered in
another country, the Committee asks for two years of in-country tests (MARA  1994, item 47).
From the  early  1990s, government has  stopped public listing of  varieties granted production
permits, putting more emphasis on registration.
Private  seed  industry  sources  agree  that  major  companies  have  no  trouble  getting  varieties
approved. In 1994, companies reported that the Registration Committee approves about 80 percent
of applications for production permits and 95 percent for registration. However, registration may be
a more serious barrier for small and new companies.
In cases where seeds of a non-registered variety are to be imported exclusively to produce an export
crop or product (eg, seeds or tomato paste), government grants import permits within several weeks
without any in-country testing or registration,  provided that the variety is listed in the OECD List of
Cultivars Eligible for Certification.
Seed Certification: Government continues compulsory certification, but this does not seem to create
problems, at least for major seed companies. Major companies lobby for a larger role in seed
certification  rather  than  for  voluntary  certification.  Currently,  the  Seed  Registration  and
Certification Centre  certifies vegetable seeds  without field checks  (or in  other words  allows
companies to check their own fields). Centre managers say this is due to lack of staff rather than
any intention to shift responsibility for quality control to private firms. However, this is consistent
with common OECD practice.
Import Controls: Government continues seed import controls that protect local seed producers and
established seed companies:
*  Government uses import permits to limit seed imports by company, with attention
to factors such as previous seed production and land available for seed production.
*  Government allows only registered seed companies to import seed. This hurts food
processors who want "higher quality seed and..  .new seed varieties required by the
processing industry" (FAO and MARA 1994, p 24).
To determine  whether  or not a group  of plants  or seeds  constitute  a variety,  standard  DUS  tests determine  if
plants are distinctive,  uniform,  and stable  (over several  generations).  Turkey  accepts  DUS tests from countries  with
strong  testing  capabilities,  such  as OECD  countries.
-9-*  According to many experts, Turkey's phytosanitary restrictions go beyond realistic
concerns about pests and disease threats.
Plant Variety Protection (PVP):  In  1994, government passed a PVP law to allow companies to
claim property rights in varieties. Based on 1994 interviews, companies expect implementation of
this law to encourage companies to introduce more non-hybrid varieties from testing or breeding
programs (even without PVP, companies have been able to protect hybrids through physical control
of parent lines). Industry sources also expect PVP to encourage foreign companies to contract in
Turkey to produce seeds for export by making it easier to prosecute anyone who pirates seeds to
compete in export markets.
Subsidies:  Government from  1985 through  1994 paid  subsidies to  private  and  public  seed
companies on specific categories of seeds (eg, hybrid maize, soybeans, etc). Government annually
announced  subsidies  in  TL  per  kg,  and  paid  that  amount  to  companies  against  receipts
demonstrating sale to farmers. Subsidies have fallen precipitously; eg, subsidies on hybrid maize
seeds ranged from 12-38 percent during 1987-1990, fell to about 1 percent during 1992-1993, and
were eliminated in 1994.
2.2  Inputs for Poultry and Other Livestock
Although introduction of foreign technology before and after 1980s reforms benefitted all livestock
subsectors, the impact is most evident in poultry. Poultry currently provides almost a third of total
meat and a nearly equal tonnage of eggs. For other livestock sub-sectors, adoption of modern
breeds and  feeding technology is less extensive than for poultry, and shares of meat and total
animal protein continue to fall.
Breeds: Introduction of new breeds has been crucial to expansion of the modern poultry industry.
Industry sources report that breeds have come in as needed, with no particular bottle-necks. One
expert reported that government from the late 1970s  relaxed controls on introduction of new breeds;
however, poultry breeds did not change much in the 1980s.
Pharmaceuticals and  Vaccines:  Through  the  early  1980s, government  did  not  allow private
companies  to  manufacture  or  to  import  poultry  vaccines,  while  government  vaccines  were
unreliable (Kreuger and Bobel, p 17). Moreover, government produced only two vaccines, for pox
and Newcastle, arguing that other diseases were not present. Facing mounting problems with other
diseases, such as egg-drop syndrome, farmers in the early 1980s pushed government officials to
recognize other diseases and to allow vaccine imports. Around 1984, government changed policies
to allow private vaccine imports.
As is standard among countries, MARA lists allowed veterinary pharmaceuticals and vaccines.
When a private company asks to add an item to the list, MARA authorities commonly ask advice
from non-MARA experts, including university professors. Sources agree that MARA approvals for
new poultry pharmaceuticals and vaccines are reasonable, and that the industry does not currently
suffer from lack of these items.
-10-Feed and Pre-Mixes:  Technology embodied in pre-mixes is one of the keys to modem poultry and
livestock production, enabling low feed-to-meat ratios with different macro-components. During
the  1980s, general  economic  reforms  encouraged  private  expansion  and  competition  in  all
components of  the  feed industry.  However, multiple  sources  --  including  a  private  pre-mix
company -- reported no major change in the character of feed and pre-mix regulations.
Regulations continue to exceed concerns about externalities, interfering in choices that could be left
to  markets. Externalities from antibiotics and  hormones justify some  limits on  feed additives.
However, MARA also registers and regulates vitamins and pre-mixes, sets minumum percents for
nutrients in feed, and sets maxima and minima for many components. MARA's objections to low-
cost components such as citrus residues boost feed costs.
2.3  Pesticides
Applying chemicals for pest control began in  Turkey on a  large scale at the end of the  1950s
(MARA 1968, p 29). Initially, MARA applied pesticides, and this has continued for some pests.
From the First Five-Year Plan (1963-67), the government has shifted responsibility for pest control
back to farmners,  encouraging them to buy and apply chemicals (Aresvik 1975, p 75). Until the late
1980s, government-managed cooperatives, selling pesticides along with  other inputs on  credit,
dominated wholesale and retail pesticide trade and largely decided what pesticides farmers would
use. On the other hand, from at least the 1960s, most pesticide production and import has been in
private hands.
The 1957 Agricultural Pest Control and Quarantine Law No 6869 sets the legal basis for regulating
pesticides. Legal frameworks for registering active ingredients (ai's), formulations, and products are
similar across most  countries, and  Turkey is  no  exception. 6 Within this  standard framework,
countries differ in details, such as: time and expense to register new products; who tests products;
whether tests from other countries are accepted; etc. Changes in these details have been important
in Turkey's 1980s reforns.
General import  and  investment liberalization from  1980 favored  competition and  production
efficiency. In  addition,  reforms  specific to  pesticide  production  and  trade  facilitated  private
introduction of  new  technology  (ie,  new  ai's)  and  strengthened competitive private  markets.
Pesticide reforms include:
*  Until  1988, all  in-country efficacy  tests  had  to  be  done  by  Plant  Protection
Institutes. From 1988, Institutes allow companies to arrange their own tests with
reputable researchers.
6  An active  ingredient  (ai) is the  chemical  that  does  the  job.  A formulation  is usually  a mix  with  one or more
active  ingredients  that  is prepared  for  sale.  A product  is a formulation  with  a brand  nane. For  new  and patented  ai's,
there  will  normally  be only  one  product  (brand)  for  each  formulation.  Once  patents  have  expired,  many  companies  may
offer  competing  products  (brands).
-Il1-*  From the end of the 1980s, government drastically cut its involvement in pesticides
trade  through  government-managed cooperatives, leaving  trade  at  all  levels to
private dealers.
*  Government  from  1994  removed  pesticide price  controls, which  had  become
unwieldy due to rapid inflation.
Several other features of Turkey's current pesticide registration process favor new technology and
competition. Government accepts toxicology data from other countries, which reduces time and
expense for companies to introduce new formulations. To register competing brands for old off-
patent formulations that are already in the market, government asks only for chemical analyses of
new brands, which favors competition and low prices for me-too or commodity products. Also,
government has from 1971 de-registered (banned) many chemicals that are highly toxic, persist in
the environment, or have chronic health or reproductive impact.
2.4  Fertilizers
From 1971, government stopped the small amount of private trade previously allowed, restricting
fertilizer import and domestic trade to Agricultural Supply Organization (DONATIM or TZDK)
and the Sugar Corporation, with government-controlled  cooperatives dominating retail trade. While
government dominated trade, a mix of public and private companies generally supplied over two-
thirds of domestic demand along with some exports.
With general import trade liberalization from 1980, the fertilizer industry gained improved access
to raw materials and spare parts, allowing higher capacity utilization and production (State Planning
Organization 1988, p 11). However, government continued to control prices and trade at all levels,
so that improvements for producers had little impact at the farm level.
From July  1986, government replaced its  monopoly in  fertilizer trade  with  a  public-private
oligopoly,  allowing  the  handful  of  fertilizer  producers  along  with  government-controlled
cooperatives and their agents to enter international and domestic fertilizer trade at all levels. From
1988, government further opened domestic fertilizer trade to  anyone with TL  1 billion capital,
leaving import trade in oligopoly hands. From September 1994, government removed this trade
barrier as well, opening fertilizer imports to any company with TL 1 billion capital. At the same
time, anticipating customs union with EU, government eliminated duties on fertilizer imports from
EU and cut duties on imports from other countries to EU levels (4.8-11 percent on various major
fertilizer products).
Despite trade liberalization, subsidies have continued. Before July  1986, government set  high
factory and low farmgate prices, paying subsidies directly to TZDK and Sugar Corporation. During
1986-1994, governnent  allowed dealers to set domestic prices, but paid subsidies in TL per kg to
dealers presenting receipts from retail sales. During 1994-97, government paid subsidies -- set in
terms  of  percent  of  fertilizer price  --  directly to  farmers presenting  proof  of  purchase,  an
arrangement which  allowed price  and  product competition, but  which  burdened farmers and
retailers with expensive paperwork.
-12-Comparisons of domestic and international fertilizer prices show that farmers gain much less than
the government spends in subsidies. Other policies -- protecting oligopolies, extending tax benefits
to exporters, and taxing imports and domestic sales -- off-set fertilizer subsidies and shift them
away from farmers.
2.5  Agricultural  Machinery
Over the last several decades, Turkey's agricultural machinery industry has had two sub-sectors: a
few  large  companies  with  international  connections  produce  tractors  with  some  imported
components; and more than a thousand mostly small and independent companies produce plows,
planters, and  other  farm machinery. Most  of  the  production  capacity for  tractors and  other
equipment has been in the private sector. Turkish companies produce most of the agricultural
machinery that is used in the country and also produce for export.
At the beginning of the  1980s, general import reforms (market access to foreign exchange and
removal of most quantitative import controls) made it easier for agricultural machinery producers to
import production equipment and parts. 1980s reforms with specific impact on the agricultural
machinery industry include:
*  In May  1984, government abolished price controls on agricultural machinery (L
Clarke 1985, p 329).
*  In early 1985, government abolished rules for domestic tractor producers (from the
1964 Assembly Industries Regulation) on minimum percent of domestic content
and lists of components not allowed for import (WB 1985, p 24).
*  With  several changes in  import  rules  through  about  1985, government  allows
imports of tractors, harvesters, and other machinery without special permission but
with tariffs.
For important items, tariffs have been reasonable; for example, in October 1994, duties on tractors
less than 100 hp, which compete with local tractors, were 23 percent, while tractors greater than
100 hp paid 15 percent duty). Lower tariffs are imminent as Turkey maneuvers for membership in
the European Union.
3.  IMPACT ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND INPUT INDUSTRIES
The chain of causation by which regulatory reformn  has an impact on agricultural productivity and
incomes goes through technology transfer and inputs supply. This section describes the impact of
reforms on  technology introduction and  inputs industries, which  addresses the  first two  sub-
hypotheses of Section 1.1: that appropriate technology is available; and that private companies are
willing and able to introduce new technology when refonns allow.
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Technology Transfer: With seed reforms from the early  1980s, the number of improved varieties
allowed for sale (with either registration or production permits) increased dramatically over the next
several years, as shown in Table 3.1. For sunflower, for example, the number of varieties increased
from three in  1982 to about 30 in 1987. For soy beans, varieties increased over the same period
from two to more than 40. Many of these new varieties have been introduced and tested at the
initiative of private seed companies as part of their efforts to expand seed sales.
Even  for  crops with  strong public  sector involvement in  seed  trade,  1980s reforms  brought
increases in numbers of varieties available, through public as well as private efforts. In wheat, for
example,  government allowed  a  total  of  only  21  improved varieties in  1982; after  reforms,
government approved an average of over five new varieties per year during  1984-94. In  1980,
Agricultural State Enterprises (TIGEM) produced seeds for 14 wheat and four barley varieties; by
1994, TIGEM offered 42 varieties of wheat and nine of barley. In sugar beets, KWS (partner with
the government in Pan Tohum) responded to competition from several fully private competitors by
selecting additional lines from their breeding program that are specially suited for Turkey.
Prior to the 1994 PVP law, companies have had no legal way to stop any other company from
taking and reproducing seed for self or open-pollinated crops such as wheat, barley, and soy bean.
Nevertheless, companies have invested to identify, test, and introduce new varieties for non-hybrid
crops. During interviews in  1994, seed company managers reported only one case of a company
multiplying seed of a variety introduced by another: TIGEM multiplied seed of a soy bean variety
that May and its international partner Asgro had introduced.
Expansion of  the  Seed Industry:  Before the  1980s reforms, the  few  private  seed  companies
importing  and producing seed  in  Turkey (one  source  reports only  one,  May  Seed  Company
[Freiberg and Grobman 1985, p 279]) focused on vegetables. In addition, there were two semi-
private seed companies: Pan Tohum, a joint  venture between the government's Turkish Sugar
Factories Company (SEKER) and  KWS, a  German firm; and BETA,  for which  the dominant
owners are sugar cooperatives, so that BETA is controlled by Pankobirlic, a government-run apex
cooperative.
In 1980, government directly managed or controlled most commercial seed production and trade
through cooperatives and SOEs, including TZDK and TIGEM. For sugar beet seeds, Pan Tohum
had a monopoly for production and import and distributed seeds through sugar cooperatives.
A 1985 World Bank paper reports nine new seed companies established from the time seed reforms
began (Freiberg and Grobman, p 280). That number increased rapidly; several years after reforms,
all major US and European-based seed multinationals had established a presence in Turkey along
with companies from Israel, Taiwan, Thailand, Japan, Korea, and other countries. In 1986, Turkish
seed  companies founded  a  Seed  Industry Association (TEBD); TEBD  in  1994 represents 29
companies,  most  of  which  are private.  The  seed  industry  includes another  50  or  so  private
companies that have not joined TEBD.
-14-Private seed sales expanded to dominate markets for several field crops and to take a share of sales
for other crops, as shown in Table 3.2.  Most of the increase in private sales has been for varieties
that private companies have introduced, so that private sales correlate strongly with technology
transfer.
For wheat, despite subsidized competition from SOEs, private seed companies have introduced new
varieties from CIMMYT and  Europe, and more are in the pipeline. Recognizing that  farmers
multiply wheat seed for own use and sale to neighbors, one seed company manager described his
plan to continuously introduce new varieties, staying ahead of mutating diseases and offering new
varieties with attractive features (eg, a US durum wheat with low percent of yellow bellies). With
farmers planting a million tons of wheat seed each year, even a small market share represents large
sales. In 1994, private companies sold wheat seed at about double TIGEM seed and grain prices.
For selected crops, Table 3.3 shows seed production plans by type of firm in 1994. Numbers do not
show market shares because firms do not follow these plans (eg, TIGEM is unlikely to more than
double wheat seed production from 1993), seed may not all be sold, and some of what is sold may
be exported. These are, however, the only numbers available to show market share. Subsidiaries of
six foreign firms proposed to produce about half of the hybrid maize and sunflower seed. Most of
the remaining hybrid maize and sunflower seed as well 98 percent of soy bean seed was to be
produced by six joint venture firms. Unofficial estimates from the firms we interviewed suggest
that market share for the largest company in maize is about 30 percent and in sunflower about 25-
30 percent. Competition appears strong in major seed markets; for example, the leading maize seed
company reports that its market share is being eroded by smaller firms undercutting its price.
Overall, the large number of companies in Turkey's seed  industry favors competitive markets
despite some tendency toward over-regulation (eg, continuing compulsory variety registration).
Seed Imports and Exports: Reforms lowering barriers to varietal introduction and to seed imports
led to more imports for some crops, such as maize and sunflower. Soon, however, production
expanded to take care of demand and then pushed into export markets as well (see Figures 3.1 and
3.2). From 1988 maize seed exports exceed imports; for sunflowers, exports exceed imports from
1990. Once  reforms  allowed seed  technology  to  enter, Turkey  has  been  able  to  exploit  its
comparative advantage in seeds based on climate, scientific skills, and low cost labor. Table 3.4
shows Turkey's exports and imports for all seeds. Chile, another early reformer, shows the same
progression from maize seed imports, to local production, and then to exports.
Maize  and  sunflower seed  imports in the  early  1980s assisted  introduction of  new  varieties,
allowing farmers to adopt them before locally produced seed was available. During the 1960s,
imports of Mexican wheat seed played a similar role, facilitating rapid expansion of area planted to
new  varieties. A  recent  study  of  maize yields  for  50  countries over  25  years  found  strong
correlation between yield increases and volume of seed imports (Pray and Echeverria 1992, pp 372-
373).
Considering the importance of imported seeds to introduce new varieties, Government efforts to
discourage seed imports (see Section 2.1) may be more effective in slowing technology transfer
than in protecting domestic seed producers. In the early 1  990s, Turkey has been importing seeds for
-15-roughly 1 percent of planted area. This can be compared to seed imports into Thailand and Chile,
which have more open seed policies, for roughly  1-3 percent of planted area in the mid-1980s
(FAO 1987, p 307; Pray 1990, p  195). Seeds are bulky and costly to move, and even reasonable
phytosanitary rules add to import costs. Aside from some high-value vegetable seeds and seeds that
require special conditions for production, lower costs with in-country production tend to dominate
decisions about where to produce seeds, favoring local production, even without protective trade
interventions.
Shrinking Public Sector Seed Sales: Seed reformers in the 1980s concentrated on building up the
private sector rather than tearing down the public sector. With even reformers afraid that private
companies would not be interested to produce relatively low value seeds for open pollinated crops
such as wheat, barley, and fodder crops, government continued to produce seed for wheat and other
major crops.
As  private  companies  have  expanded,  pressure  mounts  for  government  to  limit  SOE  seed
production and unfair competition. During interviews in 1994, managers of private seed companies
vehemently objected to SOE sales of hybrid maize seed. However, seed industry sources expected
the government through TIGEM to continue to produce wheat and barley seeds in the near and
medium-term future.
In the mid-1990s, KWS signed a  10-year contract with Pan Tohum, demonstrating government
intentions to keep a large share of the market for sugar beet seeds as well. Cotton seed production
and trade continue to be dominated by state-managed cooperatives.
3.2  Poultry
Technology Transfer: The biggest impact of 1980s reforms on poultry technology appears to have
been in the area of vaccines, where government now allows more vaccines and also private vaccine
imports. Feed technology has also improved. In 1994 Kartal Kimya, one of the two major feed pre-
mix companies in Turkey, sold 65-70 standard pre-mixes and produced another 150-200 pre-mixes
tailor-made for specific customers. Experts report feed-to-meat ratios in the poultry industry falling
from 2.2-2.5 in the early 1980s, to 2.0 in 1989, and to 1.9 in 1994.
More Competitive Private Industry: Before reforms, government monopolized production of both
allowed poultry vaccines. In 1994, an industry source estimates government's share of Newcastle
vaccine at  10-20 percent only. Table 3.5 shows impact of reforms on Turkey's poultry vaccine
imports from the US.
Competition improved in the feed pre-mix industry. Roche for many years had been the only major
company importing feed pre-mixes and components.  Kartal Kimya began to compete from 1985
and now holds about 30-35 percent of the pre-mix market, with Roche having about half.
From the 1970s, about a half dozen companies have been running breeder farms for broilers or
laying hens. There are also two (formerly three) Turkish farms producing grandparent stock. Chick
imports help to keep markets competitive (see Table 3.5). However, 1980s reforms had no major
impact on breeds or chick supply.
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Technology Transfer: At the beginning of the 1980s, Turkey had approved a cumulative total of
just over 100 ai's. After 1980, the pace of approval of new ai's and products accelerated. Annual
registration of new ai's increased from seven in the 1970s to nine in 1980-84 and then 20 during
1985-92 (see Table 3.6). By the end of 1992, Turkey had approved a cumulative total of more than
300 ai's, which can be compared to more than 700 ai's in production in the US in the 1990s and to
more than 200  ai's approved in  a number of  middle income  countries in  Latin  America and
Southeast Asia around 1990 (eg, Brazil, Columbia, Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, and Malaysia).
Accelerated registration of  new  ai's  shows  farmers gaining  access to  a  wide  range  of  new
technology, including plant growth regulators for high value horticulture and biopesticides such as
bacillus thuringiensis (Bth). Virtually all pesticides introduced into Turkey in recent decades come
from research in developed countries.
More Competition: Post-1980 increases in numbers of new products registered indicates increasing
competition in the pesticides market, which presumably lowers margins and prices. Through the
1960s, the ratio of new products to new ai's did not exceed two, which shows that many pesticide
products sold in monopoly or oligopoly markets. In the 1970s, the ratio of new products to new ai's
rose to about three, which implies more competition. From 1980 the ratio has jumped to nearly five.
During 1994 interviews, pesticide traders described the market as very competitive.
Retail trade has also shifted into private networks. The manager for a major pesticide multinational
reported that four invoices for bulk sales to cooperatives accounted for 80 percent of annual sales in
1988, whereas 85 percent of retail sales went through the company's own dealer network in 1994.
Imports and Exports: Government has consistently favored import substition for pesticides, but this
does not appear to be a major problem. Industry sources in 1994 reported a 40 percent duty on ai's
that can be produced in Turkey, but that this duty can be avoided. In 1994, Turkey imported 100
percent of  specialty ai's  (ai's  for which  patents remain  current) as  well as  a  major  share  of
commodity ai's (ai's for which patents have expired). Turkey also exports pesticides. Pesticide
exports responded more strongly than imports to 1980s  economic reforms (see Table 3.5).
3.4  Fertilizers
Technology Transfer: After 1986 reforms, competing companies introduced new products. Prior to
1986, government had allowed only two composite fertilizers, whereas by  1990 traders offered
eight  composites. Also, at  least  one  fertilizer  company initiated  a  soils research  and  testing
program. Private sales of micronutrients and liquid fertilizers have increased, but these have been
allowed all along, even when government claimed a trade monopoly for major fertilizer products.
Oligopoly: After 1986 reforms broke the government's fertilizer import monopoly, share of imports
by TZDK and Sugar Corporation fell from 100 to roughly 20 percent in  1990 (WB 1991, p  12).
Through late 1994, however, government restricted private imports to the four private producers in
-17-Turkey. In 1994, only nine public and private companies produced fertilizer, of which four were
responsible for 95 percent of total production, and concentration was even higher for individual
products. Oligopoly protected large trading margins, which along with import duties largely offset
subsidies nominally intended for farmers. In 1994, one expert estimated that trade barriers kept
retail prices comparable to border prices despite $ 400 million in subsidies, which were "half of the
[retail]  value of the fertilizers" (Gencaga 1994, p 3).
From  late  1994, when  government allowed competitive fertilizer imports, farm-level fertilizer
prices before subsidy have closely followed import parity prices.
Exports (Table 3.5):  During the 1980s, value of annual fertilizer exports increased from nothing to
more than $ 100 million, while imports showed no trend. Tax incentives favored exports. However,
Turkey's fertilizer exports depend on raw material imports. During the 1990s, exports have almost
disappeared in the face of competition from low-cost producers in Central and Eastern Europe.
Fertilizer Use: Trade liberalization from 1986 improved the convenience and reliability of supply to
farmers.  However, with continuing oligopoly, domestic prices rose from FYs84-86 to FYs9l-93,
while world prices for nitrogen and phosphates generally fell (Ange 1994, pp  17, 21-22). With
further trade liberalization in 1994, ex-factory prices fell to import-parity levels, while farm-level
prices fell even lower with heavy subsidies. Average annual fertilizer use increased from 1.5 to 2.0
million tons from  FYs84-86 to  FYs91-93 (Ange  1994, p  13), an average annual growth of 4
percent, somewhat less than the 8 percent growth rate observed during FYs69-71 to  FYs84-86
(Aresvik  1975, p  65;  Ange  1994, p  13). From  1994, fertilizer  use  shows large  year-to-year
fluctuations due mainly to instabilities in macro-economic management, with no net growth in use.
Slower recent growth is consistent with patterns in a mature fertilizer market.
3.5  Agricultural Machinery
Technology Transfer: Aside from major pieces of equipment such as tractors and harvesters, the
pattern for introducing new agricultural machinery in Turkey has been to import prototypes which
manufacturers copy for local sale. During the 1980s, new equipment copied -- or copied on a larger
scale  --  included: pneumatic  seed  drills,  drying  equipment, silage  machines,  drip  irrigation
eqipment for greenhouses, and rotary harrows. Introduction of relatively expensive hybrid seeds for
maize and sunflower created a demand for pneumatic seed drills. More maize production created a
market for grain drying equipment.
Strong Competition Except for Tractors: After 1980s reforms, the number of tractors produced and
sold in Turkey stayed roughly constant, while the number of companies producing tractors fell from
1  1 in 1984 to three in 1994. One possible interpretation is that liberalization sped exit for firms too
small to be efficient. Two private companies dominate the market (one is a joint venture with
government), which raises the spectre of oligopoly, particularly since there appears to  be little
competition from imports. For most other types of agricultural machinery, the large number of
domestic producers suggests competition, a situation which predates reforms and continues.
-18-Imports  and  Exports:  Turkey  exports  non-tractor  agricultural  machinery.  Imports  are  most
important for tractors and some other specialized large machines such as combine harvesters. Table
3.5 shows exports of farn  machinery increasing while imports tend to  fall during the  1980s.
Compared to West European farmers, Turkey's farmers want lower prices and accept lower quality,
which gives domestic producers some natural protection against imports from Western Europe, but
not from transition and developing countries. As customs union approaches, industry insiders see
opportunities to expand exports.
3.6  Convergence to OECD Patterns
1 rom  Single to  Multiple Channels for New Technology: In  developed countries, competition,
communication, and trade guide and coordinate research nationally and  internationally, without
central plans and managers. Farmers and scientists keep up with new technology through multiple
national  and  international links  between  companies,  universities,  and  government  research
agencies. Without such links, even the most advanced country would soon fall behind as research
forged ahead in other countries.
Despite a proven multiple-channel model for new technology, donor and government experts for
several decades to the 1990s built single-channel systems for technology introduction into many
developing countries, with central coordination through a public agency attached to the ministry of
agriculture.  Some  experts  are  challenging  this  model.  McMahon,  for  example,  encourages
governments to move from the "national institute model" toward a system with "many research
players" and with "upstream, downstream, and horizontal links among institutes, universities, firms,
policy-makers, and  social  groups"  (McMahon  1992,  p  6).  Antholt  advocates  "institutional
pluralism" with an enhanced role for the private sector to generate and spread new technology
(Antholt 1994, p 16).
Before reforms, Turkey fit the single-channel model insofar as government maintained a  near
monopoly on research and technology transfer in agriculture. However, government control was
not fully centralized in MARA's  General Directorate for Agricultural Research (GDAR). Other
government  agencies,  such  as  the  Cotton  Department,  Sugar  Corporation,  and  agricultural
departments of state universities, had their own scientists and research budgets and made their own
decisions.
Reforms from the 1980s allowed multiple new private channels for technology transfer. Before
reforms, private individuals broke the law to introduce new technology through smuggled inputs,
including cotton, wheat, and vegetable seeds and poultry vaccines. Reforms de-criminalized these
activities, encouraging private individuals to scout technology in other countries, to bring samples
back to test in Turkey, and then to introduce new inputs to the market.
After  reforms,  Turkish  inputs companies  have multiplied  channels to  world technology.  For
example, one Turkish  seed company in  1994 reported formal  connections with  at least seven
international companies and Cornell University as well as $ 50,000 annual expenditures to test new
varieties of maize, wheat, and  other crops in  Turkey. A Turkish feed pre-mix  company sells
products for a half dozen foreign companies.
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converges to patterns in  other developed countries but also facilitates technology transfer from
those countries. With similar institutional patterns for in Turkey as in other developed countries,
Turkish companies, universities, and other institutions can more easily access technology from a
similar array of foreign institutions.
Despite convergence in regulations, Turkey may have gone backward in another respect, cutting
budgets for public research below  levels in developed market economies. Whether and where
(GDAR, universities, etc) to rebuild budgets and public research capacity are questions for further
review.
Competitive and Private Inputs Industries: Regulatory reforms favor expansion of private inputs
industries in Turkey, moving the country towards common OECD patterns. With reforms, new
companies have been established, and  private producers and traders have taken  larger market
shares. Inputs firms have joined into trade associations, for which one of the major objectives has
been to further company influence in policy formulation. Seed companies in 1986 created the Seed
Industry Association (TEBD), which reported 29 members in 1994. Trade associations for other
inputs include Tarmakbir, an association for agricultural machinery producers, and TISIT,  the
Association of Pesticide Manufacturers, Importers and Agents, formned  in 1985. In 1994 TISIT had
28 members and was an associate member of GIFAP, the international industry association for
pesticides. Stronger companies and new trade associations reinforce reform processes, pushing
Turkey further toward convergence with common OECD patterns.
4.  IMPACT ON PRODUCTIVITY AND INCOMES
Addressing the third sub-hypothesis in Section 1.1, this Section presents evidence that Turkey's
regulatory reforms  have had  a  "significant  net positive  impact on  producer and/or consumer
incomes." To  prove  this  point, we  show  that  a  partial measure  of benefits  less  all  costs  is
significantly positive:
Benefits: Benefits are uneven across outputs. Following the train of evidence from
reforns  through inputs to outputs, Section 4.2 estimates partial benefits -- from
selected outputs only -- of 1980s reforms. In Turkey, new technology after reforms
had  a relatively  bigger impact on  inputs  for maize, sunflower, vegetables, and
poultry than on inputs for some other outputs, such as cotton or barley.
Costs: Section 4.3 considers all costs of regulatory reform.
Net Benefits: Subtracting estimated total costs from partial benefits, Section 4.4
presents a lower bound estimate for net benefits.
Section 4.1 presents  an overview of  changes in  agricultural production from the  early  1960s
through early 1990s. The impact of regulatory reforms cannot be determined from such aggregate
-20-data  since many  other changes (eg,  general trade  and  investment liberalization) also  impact
agriculture in  the  period  under  review.  Nevertheless,  aggregate data  provide  a  context  for
discussions about productivity and production for maize and other selected outputs.
4.1  Overview of Agricultural Growth 1961 to 1990s
Growth Indices: FAO indices for agriculture, crop, and livestock production in Turkey (see Figure
4.1) show little change in rate of growth from years before to years after 1980. For all three indices,
average rates of growth for 1961-63 to  1978-81 fall in the range 2.2-3.2 percent per year, while
from 1979-81 to 1991-93, growth rates ranged from 2.3-2.5 percent per year.
Inputs and Outputs: Aggregate data mask important changes in source of growth. Table 4.1 shows
that fertilizer use and tractor numbers grew at double digit annual rates in the 1960s and 1970s,
declining to 2.9 and 4.4 percent, respectively, from 1981. This suggests that new varieties and other
new technology (improved planting equipment, new pesticides, better match of fertilizers to soil
deficiencies) contributed relatively more after 1980 than before. Irrigation has not had a major
impact on growth; latest figures report only 7 percent of cultivated area irrigation.
Aggregate data also mask important differences in rate of growth for various outputs. Table 4.1
shows production  for maize, sunflower, soybeans, chickpeas, potatoes, and  tomatoes  growing
significantly faster after 1980 than FAO's crop index. Among animal products, poultry meat and
egg production grow much faster than FAO's livestock production index both before and after 1980
(see Figure 4.5).
Agricultural Terms of Trade and Other Factors: During the  1980s, government commitment to
industrial development led to policies that squeezed agriculture, so that "agriculture was taxed in
aggregate rather than subsidized as in the 1970s" (WB 1990, vol 1, p 3). Despite many liberalizing
reforms, government continued export restrictions on agricultural outputs, forcing domestic prices
below world prices, ensuring cheap food and inputs for the rest of the economy. During the 1990s,
policy-based movements in domestic input and output prices have reduced if not eliminated the
1980s bias against agriculture.
Other  factors affecting agricultural performance in  the years  after regulatory  reforms include
weather (eg, drought in 1993 and 1994) and wars in Irag and the former Yugoslavia that interfered
with sales to Iraq and Western Europe.
4.2  Benefits through Selected Outputs
For maize and sunflower, we use international prices to calculate economic benefits from actual
production compared to a counter-factual estimate of what would have happened without reform.
For several other outputs we present data to show that reform has had an impact, but we do not
estimate any monetary estimate of the magnitude of that impact.
For many agricultural commodities, Turkey's  farm-level prices have been somewhat higher than
import-parity prices over most of the last several decades. Taken alone, this suggests that Turkey
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would cut farm production as well as benefits from  input reforms. However, taxes and  trade
controls also affect non-agricultural goods, so that it is not a simple thing to hypothesize benefits
from  output  trade  liberalization in  a  distortion-free environment. Allowing  tariff-free  maize
imports, for example, would create a distortion against maize, since the currency is generally over-
valued, and may even increase overall distortions in the economy, reducing economic efficieny.
Hence, we calculate economic benefits from input deregulation based on actual production, without
making any counterfactual assumptions about what might happen with other hypothetical reforms
to end all trade distortions.
4.2.1  Maize
With FAO collaboration, government began maize research in the  1950s. After years of work,
government by 1980 had released a number of open-pollinated varieties (OPVs) and some hybrids,
but  none  gained popularity  with  farmers. As  part  of  1980s reforms,  MARA  invited  foreign
companies to send hybrids for testing. From 150 varieties submitted, MARA scientists selected 20
for tests around the country. In 1982 trials, hybrids yielded over 9 t/ha, much more than national
average yields of 2.1 t/ha, and more also than provincial average yields of 2.7 t/ha for Adana and
2.9 t/ha for Bursa, two provinces with irrigated maize and relatively high yields.
Based on these trials, government imported several thousand tons of hybrid maize seed and sold it
over several years in the mid-1980s. After about 1986, government stopped selling and left the
market to private companies. Farmers readily adopted foreign maize hybrids: CIMMYT estimates
that by 1985 one third of maize area was planted to new foreign hybrids, after which expansion of
hybrid maize area slowed. Figures for seed production and trade support these estimates. Hybrids
have replaced open-pollinated varieties on irrigated land in Cukurova near the Mediterranean, along
the Aegean, and in Marmara. In the north along the Black Sea, where maize is planted in small
upland plots, farmers continue to grow OPVs.
With a simple yield response function, we estimate the impact of post-reform hybrids on yields.
Since Turkey is a small producer and regularly imports maize, we assume that changes in maize
productivity and production have no impact on price. With some assumptions about input costs, we
then calculate the impact of higher yields on farmer net incomes.
We model maize yields in  tons per hectare as a  function of hybrids, fertilizer, irrigation, and
rainfall. Hybrid use is shown as percent of maize area sown to private hybrids, all of which came in
after and because of reform; we do not include pre-reform public hybrids, which covered only  I
percent of maize area in 1992 (CIMMYT 1994). We also include a trend variable to capture impact
of transport improvements, extension, and other activities which could increase yields. Annual
fertilizer use on maize is calculated from 1980 share of fertilizer applied to maize times annual total
fertilizer use (FAO reports that share of fertilizer going to maize drops slightly from 1980 to 1988;
we use 1980s share throughout; see Ange 1994, p 10). Maize irrigated area is not available, so
percent of total area under irrigation is used. For rainfall, we use national annual rainfall.
-22-Table 4.2 reports results of this  regression. Irrigation is  not included because the variable for
percent of total land under irrigation was never statistically significant. The coefficient for percent
of maize area planted to hybrids is positive and significant in all specifications. The trend variable
is positive and significant and lowers the coefficient for hybrids. Fertilizer is not significant in the
regressions except  when the  trend variable is not  included; over  the period, national average
fertilizer use and hence calculated use on maize grew slowly.
Figure 4.6 shows actual yield of maize and projected yield using  estimated coefficients from
specification two and actual values for fertilizer use, rainfall, and trend, but with zeros for post-
reform hybrids. The gap between actual and projected yields was greatest in 1990 at almost 2 t/ha.
Impact of post-reform private hybrids on maize yields in Turkey parallels a similar impact of
imported hybrids on maize yields in Greece during the 1970s (see Figure 4.7). Virtually all maize in
Greece is irrigated, which largely explains why national average yields for Greece exceed those for
Turkey. Figure 4.7 also shows lower maize yields in Syria, which limits variety introduction, and
higher yields in EU countries, which allow free intra-EU movement of varieties.
During  1990-92, farm-level annual gross financial value of additional production due to  post-
reform hybrids was about $  130 million ($ 255/ha over 515,000 ha; see Table 4.3). CIMMYT
reports 1992 farm-level maize and nitrogen prices of $ 178, which we use to calculate financial
benefits. We did not find cost of production surveys showing cost differences between local and
hybrid maize; we estimate higher costs for hybrid seed and for harvesting and drying a larger crop
(see Table 4.3); we assume similar fertilizer use on local and hybrid maize. With these assumptions
about costs, we estimate annual net financial benefits in 1990-92 of $ 97 million (see Table 4.3).
This is the sum of net increases in farm incomes realized by all maize farmers.
Adjusting farm-level maize and fertilizer prices to international prices, the annual net economic
benefit from private maize hybrids in 1990-92 was $79 million (see Table 4.3), or 24 percent of the
gross economic value of Turkey's average annual maize production ($ 330 million) during 1990-
92.
4.2.2  Sunflower
Sunflower was originally introduced from Europe. It  has gone through  several cycles of  area
expansion due to imported varieties then decline due to spread of the orobanche parasite. The most
recent complete cycle started in 1963 with introduction of Vinimik, an OPV orobanche-resistant
variety from Russia. In the late 1970s,  Vinimik's resistance to orobanche began to break down, with
1981 being the worst year. Private foreign hybrids, introduced on a  large scale from  1985, are
resistant to the parasite. They also have higher yield potential. However, sunflower is commonly
grown as a rainfed crop in relatively dry climates. In such conditions, lack of moisture limits yield
gains possible with hybrids. The government also developed some resistant hybrids, releasing them
in 1984; these never became popular with farmers. In 1985 Vinimik and private hybrids covered
almost equal shares of Turkish sunflower area. By 1992, Turkish seed companies produced only
193 tons of Vinimik seed compared to 3,500 tons of hybrid seed (including some for export), and
about 90 percent of area was planted to hybrids.
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sunflower productivity and production do not bring lower prices. Thus, as for maize, sunflower
hybrids boost farm profits rather than consumer surplus.
However, we met problems measuring impact of sunflower hybrids on farm income. A regression
using time-series data understates hybrid impact on yields if we do not factor into the model how
much the orobanche parasite would have reduced yields for pre-reform OPVs; we do not have
information to  make those adjustments. Also, sunflower area increased with  hybrids, and one
cannot assume that new fields realize the same increase in profits per hectare as old fields. Ideally,
data  from  detailed  farm-level surveys over time  would show  changes  in  costs  and  benefits,
including risk of parasite damage, as sunflower farmers adopt hybrids or shift into sunflower. In the
absence of such data, we estimate hybrid impact from changes in  sunflower national area and
average yield.
From information on seed import and production (see Figure 3.2), we identify  1980-84 as the
immediate pre-reform period, and  we take  1985-92 as the post-reform period. Period average
sunflower area increased from 540,000 hectares during 1980-84 to 690,000 hectares in 1985-92.
Similarly, period average yields went from 1.26 t/ha for 1980-84 1.43 t/ha for 1985-92.
Multiplying the increase in average yield from base to post-reform periods (170 kg/ha) times base
period planted area (540,000 hectares), we get an increase of 91,800 tons of oilseed production
worth $ 24 million at 1990-92 Rotterdam CIF prices, or 14 percent of the gross economic value of
Turkey's  average annual sunflower production ($  173 million) during those years. This  figure
excludes gains from: increases in planted area; higher oil content of private hybrids; and preventing
further decline in sunflower area and yield due to the orobanche parasite. On the other hand, the
economic benefit would be lower to the extent that production costs are higher for private hybrids
than for local varieties.
4.2.3  Wheat
After  1980s reforms, private companies began to introduce wheat varieties and public agencies
introduced new varieties at an accelerated rate. Information on seed production suggests that seeds
of these new varieties are beginning to reach farmers in sufficient quantities to shift varieties over a
significant share of wheat area. However, average yields do not show any impact to date. We may
be several years early to measure the impact from private wheat varieties.
Private companies in 1993 planned to produce 4,000 tons of seed for varieties that companies had
introduced from 1987 (including CIMMYT and foreign public varieties), plus 5,000 tons of other
varieties. In 1993, TIGEM planned to produce 275,000 tons of wheat seed, of which about 70,000
tons was for varieties introduced after  1982. Gross figures of actual seed production show that
private companies roughly met their plans, while TIGEM produced only about 40 percent of its
plan (see Table 3.2). We have no breakdown of actual production or sales by varieties; assuming
that TIGEM's actual production fell short evenly for all varieties, TIGEM would have produced
about 30,000 tons of seed for varieties introduced after 1982.
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would come to about one million tons. Private sales of 4,000 tons of seed of new varieties would
plant only 0.4 percent of total wheat area. TIGEM sales of seed for new varieties might supply
another 3 percent of planted area.
However, the share of wheat cropped area reached by these new varieties could be much larger than
0.4 or 3 percent.  An average farmer buying commercial seed of a new variety keeps his own seed
for several years before buying new seed; also, many multiply seed for sale to neighbors. If farmers
buy new seed every four years and do not sell seed to neighbors, then annual sales of seed for x
percent of wheat area would deliver a new variety to 4x percent of area in four years.  If farmers
buying commercial seed also sell seed to one or two neighbors in the first year, then annual sales of
seed for x percent of wheat area would deliver a new variety to 7x- I  Ox percent of area in four years.
With these estimates, new private varieties may be reaching 1.6-4.0 percent of wheat area, while
new TIGEM varieties could reach 12-30 percent of planted area.
The above estimates agree with some other available information on wheat varieties.  CIMMYT
estimates that share of wheat area planted to improved varieties increased from 50 percent in 1984
to 71 percent in 1990.  In that year, almost 30 percent of wheat area was planted to varieties from
CIMMYT, Italy, US, and Eastern Europe, some of which were introduced after 1982.
While people shifting to new varieties are responding to economic incentives, aggregate data on
wheat yields after reform do not give any indication of the effect of these incentives.  Over the
1980s, Turkey's average wheat yield grew more slowly than in previous decades and did not even
keep pace with increases in world average yield.  Part of the explanation for slow growth in wheat
yield may be slow growth in fertilizer use, as already discussed.
In the early 1990s, the annual value of the wheat crop in Turkey is roughly $ 3 billion.  New
varieties coming with reform have spread to a portion of this area. National yield data do not show
:n impact. Although private companies currently have a small share of the wheat seed market, they
have been actively looking for new foreign varieties to introduce, and they have been selling more
wheat seed.  The reform impact on wheat may be expected to grow as private companies push into
the market.
4.2.4  Vegetables for Export
Vegetable exports is an area where one would expect an impact from reforms allowing in new
varieties as well as new specialty chemicals such as plant growth regulators. The limited data which
are available show a large increase in value of vegetable exports after reform period, but are not
sufficient to estimate the increase in value due to regulatory reforms (see Table 4.4). Furthermore,
only  a  fraction of  that  value would  be  net economic benefit,  since vegetable producers  and
processors would be taking resources away from other productive activities. This section is based
on  information from a  1994 FAO and MARA  study, Turkey: Horticulture Subsector Review:
Approaches to Market-Led Development.
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from the early 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s (see Table 4.4). Growth was not even across all
vegetables, but was rather concentrated in a few. Among canned vegetables, "pickled cucumbers
and artichoke hearts packed in glass have become major export items in the last two years" (FAO
and MARA 1994, annex 4, p 9). Among fresh and frozen vegetables: fresh potato exports went
from $ 5 million in  1987 to $ 37 million in  1991; fresh cucumber exports increased from $  1
million to  $ 13 million over the same period; and frozen vegetable exports increased from $ 7
million to $ 26 million in the same four years.
The pattern of export growth suggests that regulatory reform was a factor. For one thing, fresh and
frozen vegetable exports grew most rapidly at the end of the period. Also, we can correlate export
growth for particular products with introduction of new varieties. For example, the increase in fresh
and pickled cucumber exports can be  linked to  reform, since only one cucumber variety was
allowed for sale in  1982 compared to more than 100 in  1992. Similarly, the number of potato
varieties allowed increased very rapidly from 1988, while potato exports jump in 1991.
For some vegetable exports, Turkey's relatively low cost labor is a factor. For example, pickled and
fresh cucumber exports depend on low cost labor to pick small, precisely sized cucumbers for
processing. Further rapid increases in exports are likely for some vegetable products. However,
Turkey's exports of tomato concentrate, currently about a fourth of total vegetable exports, are not
likely to grow very fast, since Turkey is already the world's third largest producer, and world
markets are highly competitive.
4.2.5  Seeds for Export
Seed exports depend on technology transfer almost in the same way garment exports depend on
imports of zippers and cloth. Before reforms, when companies could not freely send seeds and
other technology to  Turkey, they did  not  arrange seed production in  Turkey for international
markets. In other respects --- climate, low-cost labor, skills --- Turkey is an attractive country for
seed production. With the 1980s regulatory reforms, Turkey began to produce seeds for export, but
from a zero base. Volume and value are still low.
We have data on the volume but not value of seed exports. Table 3.4 reports volume and estimates
value of seed exports with some assumptions about seed prices. Annual total value of seed exports
grows from zero in the early 1980s to an estimated $ 12 million in 1992-1993. Compared to other
agricultural products and exports, seed exports are a small matter. Only a portion of this gross value
can be considered net economic benefit from reform, since seed producers are taking resources
away from other productive activities.
4.2.6  Poultry Meat and Eggs
Poultry technology transfer has had a significant impact on production and productivity from at
least the 1970s.  Reforms in the 1980s gave poultry farmers better access to vaccines and pre-mixes.
At retail level, the annual value of poultry meat and eggs consumed in Turkey has exceeded $ 1
billion from the mid-i 970s, with falling prices more than off-set by increases in volume consumed
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surplus has increased several hundred million dollars from the mid-1970s.
Shifts in the supply curve that deliver this consumer surplus (see Figure 4.9) are presumably due to
dissemination of a broad range of poultry technology and management practices, including changes
that began in the 1  960s and 1  970s. Hence, only a portion of the increase in consumer surplus can be
credited to supply shifts due to new post-reform technology.
Another issue is the extent to  which taxes and trade controls have protected Turkey's  poultry
producers. With protection, Turkey has been self-sufficient in poultry products, with  marginal
exports and imports. However, it is not clear what would have happened without protection (and
without other distortions in the exchange rate and trade regime). Despite trade controls, Turkey's
poultry meat prices have moved with prices in the US (which is a large poultry exporter), peaking
in the mid-1970s and then falling. At the end of the  1980s, the retail price for poultry meat in
Turkey was below that in the US.  However, if technology imports had not  shifted the poultry
supply curve, then Turkish production prices by the late 1980s would have been far above import
parity levels, which would have created strong pressures for more poultry imports.
4.3  Costs of Regulatory Reform
The costs of regulatory reformn  in Turkey as in any other country depend on what changes are
considered to be regulatory reforms and what are not. For example, someone might think that
regulatory reform entails cutting fertilizer subsidies, and then try to estimate costs or benefits of
doing so. To avoid some of these confusions, we clarify the definition of regulatory reform that has
been used in this paper.
Defining Regulatory Reform: Changes which reduce government controls on introduction of new
agricultural technology --- except for controls which address externalities --- are considered to be
regulatory reforms. Regulatory reform:
(a)  Focuses on liberalization rather than privatization. For example, ending a public
monopoly by revising regulations to allow free entry and competition is regulatory
reform. On the other hand, privatizing a  government enterprise such as a  seed
company is not regulatory reform, except when privatization reduces government's
ability to dominate choice of technology.
(b)  Focuses on adding new channels for introducing technology rather than weakening
existing public sector channels. Regulatory reforrns say nothing about budgets for
public sector research but do ask  government scientists to  focus more effort on
research and less on regulations that do not address externalities.
(c)  Does not attack subsidies. Although subsidies are a problem for those who manage
government budgets, most subsidies do not seriously discourage the transfer and
introduction of superior agricultural technology.
-27-With this definition of regulatory reform, we consider the costs of  1980s regulatory reforms in
Turkey.
Externalities from Imported Pests and Diseases: Regulatory reform does not entail doing away with
phytosanitary restrictions, nor has than happened in Turkey. As of 1994, many experts argue than
Turkey's  phytosanitary restrictions  are unnecessarily  strict,  suppressing seed  trade  more than
necessary to limit losses from pests and diseases. The manager of a Turkish seed company reported
that, notwithstanding phytosanitary controls, customs officials pay more attention to commercial
import controls than to  seed condition. Arguably, implementation of  reasonable phytosanitary
controls might be improved if government would go further with regulatory reforns,  getting rid of
extraneous seed import restrictions (eg, that only seed firms can import) that have nothing to do
with realistic phytosanitary concerns.
Farmer Losses from Inappropriate Varieties: During government crash  programs to  introduce
Mexican wheat in the 1960s and hybrid maize in the 1980s, government agencies decided which
varieties of seeds to buy and where to distribute them around the country. Government offered
incentives in the form of credit or subsidies to farmers buying government-selected seeds. In both
these programs, farmer choice of varieties after several years showed major differences from initial
government allocations, which suggests assignment of some inappropriate varieties and possibly
some farmer losses (Frizzell 1968; also personal communications from maize seed experts during
interviews in 1994).
With reforms, private companies working through  markets select and  promote  new varieties,
building sales over several years. Government no longer makes large commitments to new and
unproven varieties, and we did not see private companies taking big risks promoting unknown
varieties.
Before reforms farmers lost by planting inferior varieties available in Turkey when superior but
illegal varieties were available in  world  markets.  In  some  cases, particularly for high  value
vegetables, farmers smuggled seeds to avoid planting legal but inferior -- inappropriate -- varieties.
In this respect also, regulatory reforms have reduced planting of inappropriate varieties.
Farmer Losses due to Poor Quality Seed: With regulatory reforms bringing rapid expansion of
private seed production and trade, farmers have shifted a significant share of planted area for some
crops --- notably maize, sunflower, many vegetables --- from own-seed to private commercial seed.
This shift improves seed quality. Furthermore, reforms have broken crop-by-crop public and private
monopolies and oligopolies in commercial seeds; more competitive commercial seed markets favor
improvements in  quality. Also, Turkey now  produces seeds  for export; improving quality  to
compete in export markets presumably has a positive impact on quality for domestic seed as well.
Although TIGEM's seed production has fallen by more than 100,000 tons, that is due to other
policy decisions, not regulatory reforms. What happens to TIGEM, and what impact that has on
wheat seed quality is tangential to the costs and benefits of regulatory reform. Indeed, regulatory
reforms have brought in 10,000 tons of private wheat seed production, which by itself improves
wheat seed quality.
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poor  seed quality  shows that private companies take care of quality even without government
involvement. In  1994, employees in one  seed company stole expensive vegetable seed before
packaging  and  replaced  it  with  cheaper  seed.  Sale of  mixed  seed  threatened the  comany's
reputation. Apprised of its error, the company paid damages to affected farners.  Turkish seed
companies promote their brand names; this suggests self-policing for quality control.
Pesticide Externalities: With 1980s regulatory reforms, Turkey has expedited registration for new
ai's, speeding introduction of new technology. At the same time, Turkey continues to de-register
(ban)  a  growing list of  older broad  spectrum poisons (particularly organochlorines) based on
environmental and health threats. These reforms show Turkey following developed countries away
from persistent broad spectrum poisons toward newer ai's with more specific impact on pests and
less persistence in the environment.
Taken alone, new registrations and de-registrations  from 1980 suggest a shift toward safer products.
However, value of pesticide sales has also increased -- 8 percent annual growth from 1988 to 1992 -
- which increases externalities. Information is not sufficient to show the net balance of these and
other changes.
An important aspect of 1980s pesticide reforms has been a shift from bulk purchase and distribution
through cooperatives to private retail trade. This shift takes decisions about pesticide use away from
bureaucrats and cooperative officials, giving farmers more latitude to decide which pesticides to use
and when to apply them based on pest threats (consistent with integrated pest management [IPM]).
In the old system, government and cooperatives promoted standard prophylactic practices, which
are antithetic to IPM.
Regulatory reforms have stimulated horticulture exports to Western Europe. Developed country
importers demand low pesticide residues, which forces government and farmers to pay attention to
residues and to apply improved pest management practices. During the 1990s, government took
steps to begin residue testing for local markets.
Impact on Domestic Input Industries: In some countries, a common argument against regulatory
reforms is that imported inputs will damage domestic inputs industries. In Turkey, domestic input
industries not only expanded after reforms but also boosted export sales. For example, Turkey's
growing  seed  exports  clearly depend  on  regulatory reforms that  facilitate private  technology
transfer.
Weakening of Public Sector Research: During the 1980s, MARA cut the budget for the General
Directorate of Agricultural Research (GDAR), and new private seed companies hired away 30-40
senior GDAR scientists, including leaders of plant breeding programs. In Turkey, experts argue
about whether and how much 1980s changes in GDAR are a loss to the country.
Whether or not the 1980s changes in GDAR have been a major loss to the country, the loss is not
due to reform. Regulatory reforms do not entail budget cuts for agricultural research; such budgets
-29-are a separate issues. As for the loss of government staff to private companies, government's ability
to recruit and retain staff depends on budgets; firthermore, an increase in employment options for
agricultural scientists could be expected to reduce staff management problems by making it easier
for people to move and for institutions, including government, to find people with particular skills.
High  Seed Cost: Hybrid seeds are much more expensive than non-hybrid seeds; furthermore,
farmers must replace hybrid seed every year, whereas they can often keep their own non-hybrid
seed. The higher cost of seed has already been considered in estimating net income gains when
farmers buy new inputs to boost productivity.
Also, informnation  on seed costs can be misleading. In switching to hybrids, farmers are able to
reduce the seed rate; for example, the seed rate for hybrid sunflower in Turkey is only 3 kg/ha
compared to 20 kg/ha for OPV seeds; even though hybrid sunflower seeds are 5-10 times more
expensive, the lower seed rate largely compensates for the price differential. For sugar beet, seed
rate has fallen from 30 kg/ha with multigerm (non-hybrid) seed to 3 kg/ha with new monogerm
(hybrid) seed.
Sugar beet area has shifted almost entirely to hybrids, as has sunflower area. Depending on region
of the country, maize area has either shifted or not shifted to hybrids. These all-or-nothing adoption
patterns suggest that all farmers, rich as well as poor, take advantage of new technology.
4.4  Lower Bound Estimate for Net Impact
Section 4.2 estimates $ 74 million in annual net economic benefits of regulatory reforms for maize
and $ 24 million for sunflower. Evidence suggests additional large economic benefits for vegetable
exports and large financial (if not economic) gains for poultry meat and eggs. Other economic
benefits, such as gains in consumer welfare and producer incomes from vegetables marketed in
Turkey, are hard to estimate. Also, benefits increase over time as farmers and inputs industries gain
experience with new technology and business opportunities.
The costs of regulatory reform, as discussed in Section 4.3, have been non-existent to insignificant.
For example, seed quality has most  likely improved, and  farmers have  more information and
choice, so there is less risk they will plant an inappropriate variety. For pesticides, which is the area
where externalities are potentially the most serious, Turkey's regulatory reforms as implemented
from the  1980s are consistent with  a  shift to  newer pesticides, improved practices, and  more
attention  to  residues.  Finally,  regulatory  reforms  are  separate  from  other  reforms,  such  as
privatizing parastatals or cutting subsidies; hence, costs of these other reforms do not have to be
considered.
Subtracting total costs from partial net benefits(from yield increases for maize and sunflower only),
annual net economic benefits of regulatory reforms exceed $ 98 million. This confirms the third
sub-hypothesis in  Section 1, that regulatory reforns  have a "significant net positive impact on
producer and/or consumer incomes."
-30-5.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Testing Hypotheses: This  study tested hypotheses about impact of  regulatory reforms against
Turkey's  experiences.  Results  confirm  the  main  hypothesis:  regulatory  reforms  accelerated
introduction of new technology which raised productivity and incomes. The study also confirms the
three sub-hypotheses of Section 1: (1) appropriate technology was available in other countries; (2)
the private sector introduced new technology when regulations allowed; and (3) new technology
had a significant impact on productivity and incomes.
Both before and after  1980s reforms, most new technology in  Turkey has come  from foreign
countries. This observation echoes a similar finding by Eduardo Venezian for Chile: "the overall
most important innovations in Chilean agriculture post-1960 ... originate mainly abroad" (Venezian
1987, pp  107-108). While foreign research continues to provide most new technology, reforms
changed channels for technology transfer and facilitated flow.
While this  study confirms hypotheses for Turkey, some  might  argue that  aspects of  Turkish
geography and economy favored strong response to reforms. Turkey shares latitudes with Western
Europe and the US, which allows variety transfer. Entering the 1980s, hundreds of thousands of
Turkish farmers had visited European countries. Much technology was already present in fertilizer
and  other  domestic  inputs  industries.  Turkey  had  hundreds  of  agricultural  PhDs.  Also,
infrastructure such as roads, telephones, electricity, and ports was in place to handle increases in
agricultural production. In  short, people at  all levels were ready to  import and  to  adopt new
agricultural technology when reforms allowed them to act.
On the other hand, these favorable conditions meant that Turkey had already closed some of the
technology gap with West European and other developed countries. For a country that is poorer and
less developed, response to reform would be measured from a lower base, so that a  relatively
weaker response in terms of flow of new technology could bring comparable percentage changes in
input trade and output response.
Recommendations: To increase the flow of new technology to farmers in developing countries:
*  donors and governments are encouraged to review input regulations to assess the
extent to which they slow or block private sector introduction of new technology;
these assessments can be  attached to agricultural research projects, trade reform
studies, inputs projects, etc;
*  depending on  the  outcome  of  such  assessments, donors  and  governments are
encouraged to promote regulatory reforms as opportunities arise.
In Turkey after the 1980s reforms, most new agricultural technology comes from other countries
through private inputs trade, technology licensing, investment,  joint ventures, etc. Many developing
countries continue to block these channels for new technology. It makes little sense to design and
fund  projects  or  programs  to  deliver  new  technology  through  public  channels  without  first
considering essentially costless  regulatory reforms  to  un-block private  sector  channels. Once
-31-regulatory reforms are in  place to  allow private technology  introductions, public research and
extension can also be more effective.
Taking this approach, programs and projects for agricultural research and extension can be re-cast
as agriculture technology projects, with policy components to address regulatory obstacles that
block channels for technology transfer through the private sector, and with continued funding for
public research and/or extension. A  1992 Agricultural Technology Project for Mexico illustrates
this pattern (WB 1992).
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-36-Table 3.1:  trop  Varieties Approved, 1982  to 1994
Crop  harvested  varieties  new  new  new  new  new  new  new  new  new  ct  new
area in  avallable'  varietes  varieties'  varietles  valeties-  varieties-  varieties  varteties  varietes##  varietes##  varletes  added
1990  as of  1/3/82-  1/6/84-  1/6/85-  1/6/86-  3/6/t7-  1/618-  1/690-  6/8/91-  2117/92-  to OECD list In
_  _  has)  31/5/82  31/5/84  31/5/85  31/5/86  2/6/87  31/5/88  31/5/90  5/J8/1  2017/92  279114  1993#
Wheat  9,400,000  21  1  10  9  2  16  5  16  1  2  164
Sunflower  715,000  3  5  8  10  6  7  20  11  7  0  127
Cotton  641,000  9  2  0  5  1  1  5  1  4  0  18
Maize  406__  _  _  __  __  _  ___  _  _
Hybrid  155,000  24  35  24  9  22  22  48  23  1  1  406@
Other  360,000  20  1  0  0  4  5  0  0  0  0
Sugarbeets  378,000  11  5  7  3  3  1  3  2  0  0  108
Tobacco  320,000  31  0  0  6  1  0  2  0  0  0
Potatoes  192 000  8  3  6  3  1  0  14  13  8  3
Tomatoes  126,000  43  14  10  0  8  11  122  67  3  2
Soybeans  74,000  2  27  0  12  4  11  7  9  0  2  69
Cucumbers  16,000  1  2  0  2  4  5  57  50  3  0
Note: The major reform  that allowed  an increase in number  of varieties available,  as shown in the table,  was agreement on the part of key  MARA officials  from about 1983  to grant
production  permits (i.e.,  temporary registration)  more expeditiously,  and to sometimes  waive  in-country performance  tests.
Other  notes:
Cumulative  number  of varieties  available  on 31/5/92  includes varieties either registered  or with unrestricted  production permits on that date.
For ali other dates,  the tabTe  shnws  number of new varieties  introduced from the previous  date given in the table; number of new varieties  is calculated as the sum of new varieties
introduced  with new registration  or unrestricted  production  permits;  lists have been scrutinized  to avoid counting varieties  that were, for example,  newly registered  but had previously been
available  with an unrestricted  production  permit.
#  The  last column lists numbers of new varieties  added  to OECD's List of Cultivars Eliaible for Certification  in 1993.  Since  the US does not restrict varieties, US farmers legally have
access  to all of these new varieties. Farmers  in EU countries, which  share a Common Catalogue,  have access  to a large share of these varieties.
@  OECD  gives no breakdown  into hybrid  and non-hybrid  cultivars.
Sources: Harvested  areas for field crops  are from: SIS, 1990  Agricultural Structure  and Production,  p 4. Total areas for cucumbers and tomatoes are from:  SIS, General  Agriculural
Census 1991, p 65.  Available  and new  varieties  for various  years and periods are from: Resmi  Gazette for 31 May 1982,  31 May 1984,  31 May 1985, 31 May 1986, 2 July 1987, 3 May
1990,  5 August 1991,  20 July 1992, and 20 July 1994. Numbers  of cultivars added to OECD's  list are from: OECD, List of CuKtivars  Eligible  for Certification 1993 (Paris:  OECD, 1993).
-37-Table 3.2:  Comnmerciall  Seed Production, 1980 to 1993 (metric tons)
Crop  Sectot  1980  1985  1990  1993
Wheat  Private  0  <1,000  7,000  10,000
Public  49,000  188,000  124,000  103,000
Barley  Private  0  0  0  300
Public  13,000  35,000  16,000  10,000
Hybrid Sunflower  Private  0  80  2,600  3,500
Public  0  10  30  40
OPV sunflower  Private  0  na  na  na
Public  2,500  na  na  na
4,800  1,000  200
Hybrid maize  Private  na  1,800  4,500  7,200
Public  na  300  200  200
Total  900  _
Sugarbeets  Private  na  3,400  na  3,300
Public  na  0  na  3,300
Cotton  Private  0  0  500  300
Public  35,000  27,000  30,000  31,000
Potatoes  Private  na  800  4,200  2,200
Public  na  6,300  900  200
Total  2,000
Chickpeas  Private  0  0  0  90
Public  0  200  200  70
Soybeans  Private  0  800  3,200  3600
______________  _Public  0  1,100  600  200
Vegetables  Private  na  300  600  700
________________  _Public  na  30  30  30
________  ________  Total  1l9  1
Notes:  Data have been rounded off to two significant figures for hundreds and above; for hundreds and below, data
have been rounded to one significant figure.
Seed produced by registered seed companies.
Sources: Various publications of TEBD (Turkish Seed Industry Association).
-38-Table 3.3:  Seed Production  Plans by Tyl Pe  of Firm, 1994
Tbpe of firm  Units  Maize  Sunflower  Soybean  Wheat
Subsidiaries of  Metric tons  6,200  1,500  0  2,500
foreign firms  _
% share  50  48  0  1
Joint ventures  Metric tons  5,500  1,500  3,100  0
% share  45  49  98  0
Other Turkish  Metric tons  400  0  0  6,800
private  firms
% share  3  0  0  2
Turkish public firms  Metric tons  310  110  70  275,000
% share  3  3  2  97
Total  Metric tons  12,400  3,100  3,200  284,000
Sources:  Calculated from:  MARA, Tohumluk Proorami 1994  (Ankara: MARA, 1994).
-39-Table  3.4: Seed Ex  rts and Imp  orts,  1980  to 1993
Crop  Category  1980-82  1983-85  1980-88  1989-91  1992-93  Comments
average  averaqe  average  average  average
Wheat  and barley  Export  (tons)  0  0  600  2,000  700  Virtually  all in the
Import tons)  200  1  6,000  14,000  2,500  public sector
Hybrid  maize  Export  (tons)  0  0  600  1,200  1,800  Mostly  private,
Import  (tons)  200  1,000  1,500  50  200  except  for  mid-80s
imports
Hybrid  sunflower  Export  (tons)  0  0  0  300  1,400  Private  sector
Import (tons)  0  500  1,400  300  0
Vegetables  Export  (tons)  0  90  90  110  140  Private  sector
Import (tons)  20  90  140  200  210
Potato  Import  (tons)  10  3,500  6,700  7,100  2,100
Soybean  Import  (tons)  1,300  3,400  5,000  2,500  0
Cotton  Import  (tons)  100  0  100  500  80
Others  Export  (tons)  0  50  40  300  40
Import  (tons)  80  400  200  700  400
TOTAL  EXPORT
VOLUME
Vegetables  (tons)  0  90  90  110  140
Others  (tons)  0  50  1,400  3,900  4,100  _-




Vegetables  (tons)  20  90  140  200  210
Potatoes  (tons)  10  3,500  6,700  7,100  2,100
Others  (tons)  1,900  22,000  14,000  18,000  3,200
Notes:
Value  per  ton of seeds  exported  has  been  estimated  at $50,000  for vegetables,  $1,500  for hybrid  maize  and  sunflower,
$250  for wheat  and barley,  and  $500  for all other  crops.
Source:  Volume  of exports  and  imports  from  various  TEBD  publications.  Values  are estimated.
-40-Table 3.5: Exports  and Imports of Selected Inputs, 1970  to 1992
Year  Pesticide  Pesticide  Manufactured  Manufactured  Farm  Farm  Vaccine  Chick
exports  Imports  fertilizer  fertlizer  machinery  machinery  Imports  Imports*
($1,000)  ($1,000)  exports  imports  exports  Imports  from US  (1,0O0s)
($1,000)  $1,00  ($1,000)  ($1,000)  ($1,000)
1970  0  2,900  0  31,800  0  7,800  0  5,800
1971  0  6,700  0  31,500  0  4,600  0  6,400
1972  800  8,800  100  61,400  0  12,900  0  7,300
1973  1,000  9,000  0  130,400  0  27,200  0  8,300
1974  1  ,100  12,600  0  101,000  0  24,600  0  8,500
1975  500  22,600  0  48,400  0  68,900  0  9,700
1976  300  24,900  0  97,400  100  209,200  0  10,200
1977  1,000  31,200  0  212,100  100  215,600  0  1  1,600
1978  1,800  39,000  0  282,200  700  109,800  1.7  12,300
1979  700  35,400  0  353,400  600  15,200  0  13,300
1980  1,200  31 ,800  0  391,500  2,600  34,300  0  14,200
1981  1-300  26,000  0  240,000  11,400  40-700  0  14,400
1982  1,400  28,200  44,500  51,000  4,700  101,100  4.3  14,000
1983  4,500  22,300  14,400  120,000  5,500  40,000  0  14,400
1984  800  35,700  35,100  127,300  12,000  28,400  20  15,100
1985  4,100  37,500  70,600  183,200  7,600  39,000  2.4  15,400
1986  1,200  38,400  128,800  159,100  10,600  59,000  85  15,500
1987  5,100  43,400  131,000  299,100  21,700  41,700  198  15,900
1988  6,400  45,600  232,100  242,300  20,700  21,400  188  16,200
1989  2800  46600  101,400  270,500  12,300  22,500  184  16,500
1990  I 4,100  _  60,9_0  71,200  247,900  3,900  41,100  154  16,800
1991  12,500  59,000  54,600  264,800  13,500  65,300
1992  20,100  66,900  38,200  215,500  12,600  65,000
Notes:
The table shows volume of chick imports,  not value.
Sources: Data on pesticides,  fertilizers, and farm machinery  are from FAO,  Aorostat-PC. Data on vaccine imports are from USDA. Data
on chick imports are from FAO.
-41  -Table 3.6:  New R  gistrations for Pesticide Active Ingredients, Formulations, and Products, 1959 to 1992
Year  Number of new active  Number of new  Number of new  CF: number  of new active
Ingredlents#  registered  formulatlons#  registered  products#  registered  Ingredients  registered  in
_erdod  averages)  (period  averages)  (period  averages)  the US (period  averages)
1959  1  1  1  na
1960-64  4  4  6  na
1965-69  4  6  10  16^
1970-74  7  10  19  13
1975-79  . 7  9  23  14
1980-84  9  11  44  14
1985-89  20  27  100  12
1990-92  20  28  67  10
Total through  307  423  1,218  ca 700
1992  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Notes:
*  Average new registrations for 1967-1969 only.
#  An active ingredient (ai) is the chemical that does the job.  A formulation is any mix or form in which an ai is to be sold; there
are commonly many formulations for each ai.  A product is a formulation with a specific brand name.  Numbers in the table are
based on registrations current in 1993; new registrations in early years may be somewhat understated, since some registrations
have been withdrawn due to environmental and health concerns.
Source: TISIT (Association of Pesticide Manufacturers, Importers and Agents), Registered Agrochemicals in Turkey 1993 (Istanbul:
TISIT, no date); and Rob F. Esworthy, Jihad A. Alsadek, and Donald R. Stubbs, "Chemicals Registered for the First Time as
Pesticidal Active Ingredients Under FIFRA," mimeograph, Office of Pesticide Programs, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA, (Washington, DC:  EPA, 1993).
-42-Table 4.1:  Average Annual Growth in Inputs Use and in Production, Area, and Yield for Key Crops, 1961 to 1991
(in percent)
Input  or crop  1961-71  1971-80  1981-91
Fertilizer (nutrient use)  26  1_4  2.9
Irrigated area  3.8  1.1  1.3
Tractor (number operating)  1  1  17  4.4
Wheat
Production  3.06  5.08  1.54
Area  1.03  0.82  0.26
Yield  2.01  4.22  1.28
Barley  _
Production  0.64  5.07  1.46
Area  -0.83  1.07  1.23
Yield  1.49  3.96  0.23
Maize
Production  1.23  2.31  5.20
Area  -0.60  -0.86  -1.25
Yield  1.84  3.20  6.53
Sunflower
Production  19.76  2.65  4.83
Area  16.18  0.96  2.92
Yield  3.07  1.67  1.85
Soybeans 
Production  11.21  -17.03  16.99
Area  7.43  -8.34  11.76
Yield  3.52  -9.59  4.68
PChickpeas  _ 
Production  2.73  5.12  13.80
-Area  1.00  4.51  15.27
-Yield  1.71  0.59  -1.27
Sugarbeet  _  _  _  __  __  _  2.23
Production  4.56  5.16  2_23
Area  -1.70  8.11  0.80
-Yield  __  ___  6.38  ___  -2.72  1.42
Cotton
Production  7.49  -1.10  2.07
Area  -0.79  -1.37  -0.43
Yield  8.34  0.28  2.11
Potato
Production  3.31  4.30  4.34
Area  1.12  0.29  0.68
Yield  2.16  4.00  3.64
Tomato
Production  4.51  8.20  5.89
Area  2.67  3.48  4.71
Yield  1.80  4.56  1.13
Source:  Growth rates estimated by Pray with data from:  SIS, The Summary of Agricultural Statistics, various years.
-43-Table  4.2: Maize  Yield  Response  Function,  1961  to 1991
Specification  % Hybrid  In % hybrid  Fertlha  (kgs)  In fert/ha  (kgs)  Rainfall  Trend  Adjusted  R2
1.  3.40  0.011  2.44E-04  0.916
(0.474)  (0.0019)  (7.37E-04)
2.  2.888  1  .38E-03  4.58E-04  5.34E-02  0.924
(0.522)  (5.30E-03)  (7.14E-04)  (2.73E-02)
3.  0.056  0.161  0.868
(0.009)  (0.031)
Note: Numbers  in parentheses  are standard  deviations  for  the variables.
Sources:  Percent  of maize  area  planted  to private  or post-reform  hybrids  was  calculated  from TEBD  data. Fertilizer  use  is from
FAO  data  on 1980  percent  of fertilizer  use  on maize  (Ange  1994,  p. 10) multiplied  by FAO  annual  data  on national  fertilizer  use.
Rainfall  is from national  annual  data.
Table  4.3: Net  Financial  and Economic  Benefits  from  Hybrid  Maize,  1990  to 92
Item  Before  reform:  After  reform:  Counter  factual:  Change  due to reform
1980-82  1990-92  1990-92  .(private  hybrids)
Average  yield
Volume  (mt/ha)  4.13  2.70  1.43
Financial  value  @ $178/ton*  ($/ha)  2.18  735  481  255
Economic  value  @  $1  48/ton**  ($/ha)  611  400  211
Average  fertilizer  use  on maize
Volume  (kg/ha)  87  120.8  120.8  0
Financial  value  @ $178/ton ($/ha)  21.5  21.5  0
Economic  value  @ $335/ton*-  ($/ha)  40.5  40.5  0
Seed  for representative  hectare
OPV  seed  volume  @  37 Iha#  37  26  37
Hybrid seed volume  - 28 kg/ha#  8.4  0
Financial  OPV  seed value @  $178/ton ($/ha)  4.6  6.6
Economy  OPV  seed  value  ~  $148/ton  ($/ha)  3.9  5.5
Financial  and economic  hybrid  seed  value  @  25.0  0
2,970/ton  ($/ha)
Total  financial  seed  value  for representative  29.6  6.6  23.0
hectare
Total  economic  seed  value  for representative  28.9  5.5  23.4
hectare  ($/ha)
Harvesting  and drying  costs,  calculated  as one-
sixth  value  of  production  ($/ha)
Financial  value  123  80  43
Economic value  102  67  35
Net impact for hectare maize
Net  financial  benefits  ($/ha)  189
Net  economic  benefits  ($/ha)  153
Total  area planted  to maize  (hectares)  581,000  515,000
Net impact for all 1992 maize planted area
Net  financial  benefits  $97,000,000
Net economic  benefits  $79,000,000
Notes:
Actual  farm-level  market  prices  for maize  and fertilizer  (nitrogen  nutrient)  are from  CIMMYT,  1993/94  World  Maize  Facts
and  Trend  (Mexico: CIMMYT,  1994).
**  The economic  price  for maize  is calculated  as average  FOB  US  GULF  for 1990-92  plus  $41 for  transport. The  economic
price  for fertilizer  is  calculated  as  the FOB  price  for nitrogen  in urea;  Turkey  both  imported  and exported  urea  during  1990-92.
#  Seed  rates  from  CIMMYT,  op cit.
-44-Table  4.4: Vegetable  Production  and Ex 3ort,  1979  to 1992
Crop  and category  1979-81  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Tomato  ____=
Production (1,000 tons)  3,550  5,750  6,000  6,200
Fresh export (1,000 tons)  42  78  34  107
Fresh export ($1,000,000)  30  24  13  13  29
Tomato concentrate  I_I
Production (1,000 tons)  155  150  105  164  198  290  250
Export (1,000 tons)  124  149
Export  (see bottom  of
table)  _  _  _
Potato
Fresh export (1,000 tons)  44  48  40  22  219
Fresh export  ($1,000,000)  =  =  _  __  -_  5  5  6  5  43
Onions,
Production  (1,000 tons)  1,071  _  1,360  1,550  1,700
Fresh export (1 000 tons)  133  164  148  85  202
Fresh export ($  ,000,000)  1  2  15  17  13  33
Cucumbers
Production (1,000 tons)  503  __
Fresh export (1 000 tons)  3  7  12  23
Fresh export ($i.000,000)  1  4  7  13
VEGETABLE  EXPORTS  ca 1  00'  _379
($1,000,000)  of which:__
Tomato concentrate  74  89
Canned  vegetables  < 50  98
Other  vegetable  exports  of  60@  72  65  81  96  126  96  98  89  109  192  163
which:
Fresh vegetables  65  69  65  55  149
Frozen vegetables  7  15  15  25  26
Dehydrated  vegetables  12  12  6  8  13
Notes:
Estimated.
Data  from SIS,  reported  in GATT,  1994.
@  Data  for 1981  only.
Sources:  FAO and MARA,  Turkev  Horticulture  Subsector  Review:  Approaches  to Market-led  Development  (Rome: FAO,  1994),  tables 7 and
9, and annex  4, p  9 and table 1;  and GATT,  Trade Policy  Review: Republic  of Turkey  (Geneva: GATT,  1994),  vol. 1, pp 59-60.
-45-Figure  3.1: Hybrid  Maize  Seed  Production,  Imports,  and Exports,
1980  to 1993  (1,000  tons)
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Source: Govemment  of Turkey  and  Turkish  Seed Industry  Association.
-46-Figure  3.2: Hybrid  Sunflower  Seed  Production,  Imports,  and Exports,
1980  to 1993  (1,000  tons)
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Source: Government  of Turkey  and Turkish  Seed  Industry  Association.
-47-Figure 4.1: FAO Production Indices for Turkey, 1961  to 1993
(1979481  = 100)
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Source: SIS, The Summary of Auricultural Statistics (Ankara: SIS, various years).
-49-Figure 4.3. Yields of Sugarbeet and Cotton,
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Source: SIS, The Summary of Agricultural Statistics (Ankara: SIS, various  years)
-50-Figure  4.4.  Yields of Potato and Tomato,










Source: SIS, The Summary of Aqricultural Statistics (Ankara: SIS, various years).
-51-Figure 4.5:  Poultry  Production  Index, 1961-1992  (1961 = 100)
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Source: Actual from SIS, The Summary of Aaricultural Statistics (Ankara: SIS, various  years).
Projected  using coefficients from Table 4.2.
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-54-Figure 4.8: Real Prices of Meat and Eggs, 1962  to 1992
(1,000  TL per metric ton)
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Note:  Prices are current farmgate prices in TUton divided by (CPI x 0.01),  where CPI is the
consumer price index with 1985  = 100. FAO prices for poultry meat agree with OECD prices to
1977, then sharply  diverge. We take OECD poultry meat prices,  which are consistent  with other
poultry meat price series (e.g., Ankara consumer  prices). Ideally, we would use national consumer.
price series for poultry products, but these are not available. However,  urban consumer  price series
which are available show the same pattem of rising then falling prices, so using  wholesale prices
does not appear to be introducing  any bias in estimates of consumer  price
trends or changes in consumers'  surplus
Sources: FAO and OECD.
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Note: During 1990-92,  FAO data show number  of birds doubling, which does not agree with
relatively stable production and real prices for meat and eggs. The figure above omits data for
1991  -92.
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